

The Importance of Sector Constraints¹

Jeanie Wyatt, CEO and Chief Investment Officer

James R. Kee, Ph.D, Chief Economist

South Texas Money Management

History provides plenty of examples of individual sectors reaching unsustainable market capitalizations relative to the total value of the market. When these sector weights fall back it can be catastrophic for investors. Examples include energy in the early 1980s, the post millennium tech bust, and the current crisis in the financial sector. But getting in and out of the right sectors at the right times is difficult for several reasons, including the nature of the economy and the limitations of models that rely on macroeconomic variables as inputs. Previous studies suggest that putting a cap on sector weightings allows investors to avoid the most serious damage from these “sector corrections.” We find support for this at the broad MSCI GICS sector level using 20 years of data.

Sector Investing and the Business Cycle

Business cycles, or the short-run fluctuations in aggregate economic activity around a long-run growth path, do not occur at regular or predictable intervals. They are *recurrent but not periodic*,² meaning the economy’s ebbs and flows do not resemble an orderly series of repeatable patterns of similar magnitude and duration. What are referred to as cycles are really reactions to varied and random shocks from a variety of sources, including *global* (e.g. China), *institutional* (e.g. regulatory) *endogenous* (e.g. technology) and *exogenous* (e.g. central bank policy) shocks.

That means that “Investing along the business cycle” requires the ability to forecast these shocks ahead of time and to anticipate sector performance accordingly. But the varied constellations of economic conditions around these events make them somewhat one time affairs, unlikely to repeat themselves in ways similar enough to offer guidance for investors. Even if they did, it can be argued that markets learn and update (rational expectations), which means that the timing of performance among economic sectors would vary from one cycle or shock to the next. Perhaps that is why a recent investment study that rotated sectors according

¹ ©2009 South Texas Money Management, Ltd. All Rights Reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced without permission.

² The late business cycle expert Victor Zarnowitz’s well-known description. Zarnowitz, v. *Business Cycles, Theory, History, Indicators, and Forecasting*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992.

to conventional wisdom³ over the past 9 post-WWII cycles found that, even with perfect hindsight, investors would have realized at best marginal outperformance insufficient to cover transaction costs.

Building Top-Down Models

Another approach to active sector investing uses various macroeconomic variables like exchange rates, interest rates, and oil prices to forecast sector returns or earnings directly. “*Prices lead quantities*” is a key theme of many of these models. That is, quantity data like unemployment, GDP, consumer spending, etc., has to be counted and so is only available with a lag, making it backward-looking or at best coincident. Quantity data is also often based upon sampling, making it subject to frequently large revisions once more complete data become available. *Price data*, on the other hand, are forward-looking and have forecasts embedded in them. Price variables like interest rates and commodity prices are determined by supply and demand. They summarize the forward-looking expectations of the often millions of market participants who determine their magnitude. That is why it is often asserted that prices set in markets contain more information about the future than any single analyst could possess.⁴

Unfortunately, these “market-based” models all suffer from what has been called “the signal extraction problem.” That is, because market price variables are driven by supply and demand factors, the same “signal” - like a rise in currency values - can have entirely different investment implications depending upon which influence, supply or demand, is the driving it.

For a simple example take interest rates, which are determined by the supply and demand for loanable funds. Economic expansions usually result in an increase in the demand for loanable funds, which puts upward pressure on interest rates. On the other hand a reduction in the *supply* of loanable funds - perhaps due to a credit crunch - will also put upward pressure on interest rates. The demand-driven interest rate rise in the first case is bullish for investors in general because it reflects an expanding economy, while the supply-driven interest rate rise is bearish because it reflects tighter credit markets. Quantitative time series models that use interest rate movements as inputs will mix these two very different types of signals together, distorting the forecasting result rather than clarifying it.

Another example would be the supply-shock induced oil price increases of the 1970’s, which were bearish, versus the global demand-driven price increases of the 2004-2008 period, which

³ Stangl, J, Jacobsen, B, and Visaltanachoti, N., “Sector Rotation over the Business Cycle,” presented at the 20th Australasian Finance and Banking Conference, The University of South Wales, December 13, 2007. Conventional wisdom refers to the upstream/downstream sequence of materials outperforming coming out of a cyclical trough, followed by industrials (manufacturing), consumer durables consumption, etc. , popularly summarized in Stovall, S. 1995 Standard & Poor’s Guide to Sector Investing, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1996.

⁴ Hayek, F. “The Use of Knowledge in Society”, *American Economic Review*, XXXV, No. 4. 1945

were bullish. Trained economists miss this routinely. For example, in August of 2004 more than a third of the 56 economists that made up the Wall Street Journal's forecasting survey felt that oil in the \$50 to \$59 range could lead to recession. This view was revised a year later with 8 out of 10 believing that it would take a rise to more than \$80 a barrel to bring on recession⁵. Of course, when recession did occur in December 2007 the price of oil was over \$90, and the recession is widely attributed to the global financial crisis, not the price of oil, which plummeted as the recession worsened. There was clearly little comprehension at the time (though there is now) of the importance of discerning whether the higher oil price was demand driven or supply driven.

Passive Sector Approaches

These hurdles to forecasting provide considerable rationale for the use of more passive sector allocation strategies. Chief among these is to just hold the current market capitalization-based weights. The argument here rests on a straightforward assumption of efficient markets: Any weighting other than the market weight reflects a bet against the market, suggesting that the market is inefficient or mispriced.⁶

Standing somewhat in contrast to this view is the notion that markets don't price sectors efficiently, at least in the short term. That is, at any point in time some sectors are overvalued and some are undervalued. This is somewhat analogous to the case for over or underweighting individual securities. Holding all sectors at current market weights would thus mean overweighting the overvalued sectors and underweighting the undervalued sectors,⁷ which is the opposite of what a sector strategist would want to do.

Sector Caps

A promising middle ground strategy that does not rely on sector forecasting models or upon the passivity of assuming market efficiency lies in applying sector weight limits or "caps."

Writing in the May, 2007 volume of the *Journal of Asset Management*, authors Stanley G Eakins and Stanley Stansell examined the optimal portfolio strategy across 19 sector funds for the December 1995 to December 2002 period. Starting with an equal weighting of 5.26 percent in each sector they analyzed the returns that could be achieved by rebalancing when any one sector grew to a trigger threshold. By evaluating different trigger points they determined that the optimal portfolio returns were achieved when the portfolio was rebalanced when any

⁵ Hilsenrath, J. and Annet, T. "Inflation Estimates Creep Up," *The Wall Street Journal*, April 8, 2005.

⁶ For an overall view of this position see Financial Engine's Jones, C. *The Intelligent Portfolio*, Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 2008.

⁷ See Arnott, Markowitz, et al. *The Fundamental Index: A Better Way to Invest*, Hoboken: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. 2008.

sector grew to more than 9 percent of the total portfolio value. Higher returns were achieved with a 10 percent threshold, but with the cost of a higher standard deviation. Nine percent had the highest Sharp ratio. The authors’ straightforward conclusion was that *consistent* rebalancing “reduced investor exposure to sectors that have grown rapidly and may experience reduced performance.”

We conducted a similar study using the broader ten GICS⁸ sector codes over a longer 20-year period⁹. We sought to improve upon the performance of the S&P 500 Index by utilizing monthly rebalancing to maintain an upper capitalization on sector allocation as a percentage of total portfolio value. When sector weights exceeded the threshold, the excess weight was allocated to other sectors on a pro-rata basis within the cap limits. No assumptions were made for transaction costs, taxes, management fees, and other frictional costs.

Our study looked at the period from September 1989 to February 2009, comprising 19 full calendar years. We looked at maximum sector caps or ceilings between 10 and 30 percent. The results, summarized in **Figures 1** and **2** below, indicate that a 10% cut off or maximum sector weight produced the best return/risk tradeoff, where return is measured by absolute annual return and risk is measured by the annualized standard deviation of daily returns. Placing caps on sector weights makes sense up to about 15%, but beyond that the gains from sector constraints are small. Rebalancing the S&P 500 index on a monthly basis with a 10% sector cap produced annual returns in excess of 1.1% over the S&P 500. The 10% cut off also produced the lowest maximum drawdown:


Figure 1: Investment Performance Across Sector Constraints

Description	Returns			
	Absolute Annual Return	Sigma	Return/Risk	Max. Drawdown
Cut off 10%	7.3%	17.2%	42.5%	48.8%
15%	6.7%	17.9%	37.6%	50.5%
20%	6.4%	18.1%	35.4%	51.4%
25%	6.3%	18.2%	34.6%	51.4%
30%	6.2%	18.2%	34.0%	51.4%
S&P 500	6.2%	18.3%	33.9%	51.4%

FIGURE 2: GRAPH OF RISK/RETURN PROFILE

⁸ GICS refers to the Global Industry Classification Standard established jointly by Standard & Poor’s and MSCI Barra.

⁹ The results of this study are based on various hypothetical assumptions and historical data. Past performance is not necessarily indicative of future results. The results of this study are for general informational purposes and are in no way to be construed as investment advice or reflective of South Texas Money Management’s actual investment performance or investment practices.



Looking at batting averages (**Figure 3** below), the 10% cap with monthly rebalancing produced a higher risk/return ratio in 14 years, or 73% of the time over the 19 full-year periods. It produced a lower maximum drawdown in 18 years, or 95% of the time. These results are calculated from the far-right columns of **Figure 3**:

Figure 2: Year-by-Year Results: 10% Strategy Versus S&P 500 Index

Description Year	10 % Cap				S&P 500				Comparisons	
	Absolute Annual Return	Standard Deviation	Return/Risk	Maximum Drawdown	Absolute Annual Return	Standard Deviation	Return/Risk	Maximum Drawdown	Return/Risk 10% Strategy Minus Market	Max. Drawdown Market Minus 10% Strategy
1989	2	8.7	22.98850575	7.1	2	8.7	22.98850575	7.1	0	0
1990	-2.7	15.9	-16.98113208	18.9	-3.1	16.1	-19.25465839	19.2	2.27352631	0.3
1991	29	14.1	205.6737589	12.9	30.5	14.3	213.2867133	14	-7.612954421	1.1
1992	7.9	9.5	83.15789474	5.5	7.6	9.7	78.35051546	5.6	4.807379273	0.1
1993	11.3	8.6	131.3953488	4.4	10.1	8.6	117.4418605	4.8	13.95348837	0.4
1994	2.2	9.8	22.44897959	8.6	1.3	9.8	13.26530612	8.5	9.183673469	-0.1
1995	37.8	7.6	497.3684211	2.4	37.6	7.8	482.0512821	2.6	15.317139	0.2
1996	21.1	11.3	186.7256637	7.4	23	11.8	194.9152542	7.4	-8.18959052	0
1997	31.8	16.9	188.1656805	9.9	33.4	18.1	184.5303867	10.8	3.635293733	0.9
1998	25.2	18.1	139.2265193	16.8	28.6	20.3	140.8866995	19.2	-1.66018017	2.4
1999	15	15.5	96.77419355	11.3	21	18.1	116.0220994	11.8	-19.2479059	0.5
2000	1.9	17.8	10.6741573	12.2	-9.1	22.2	-40.99099099	16.6	51.66514829	4.4
2001	-9.3	18.4	-50.54347826	23.9	-11.9	21.5	-55.34883721	35.7	4.805358948	11.8
2002	-20.3	25.1	-80.87649402	39.6	-22.1	26	-85	47.4	4.123505976	7.8
2003	27.2	16.1	168.9440994	36.5	28.7	17.1	167.8362573	45.4	1.107842069	8.9
2004	14.4	10.7	134.5794393	12.1	10.9	11.1	98.1981982	25.6	36.38124105	13.5
2005	6.1	10.5	58.0952381	6.8	4.9	10.3	47.57281553	19.5	10.52242256	12.7
2006	18.5	9.9	186.8686869	7	15.8	10	158	11.5	28.86868687	4.5
2007	9.9	15.7	63.05732484	9.3	5.5	16	34.375	9.9	28.68232484	0.6
2008	-35.1	40.2	-87.31343284	48.3	-37	41	-90.24390244	50.7	2.930469603	2.4
2009	-17.7	14.1	-125.5319149	48.8	-18.2	14.7	-123.8095238	51.4	-1.722391084	2.6

Using the 3-month U.S. Treasury Bill for calculating the Sharpe ratio, along with the annualized standard deviation of daily returns on a three-year moving average basis., we also found that the rebalanced S&P 500 Index with a 10% cap has a slightly better Sharpe ratio (**Figure 3**) and lower volatility (**Figure 4**) relative to the S&P 500:

Figure 3

Figure 3: Three-year Moving Average Sharpe Ratio





Figure 4: Three-year Moving Average Volatility



Conclusion

Using data from September, 1989 through February, 2009, we have shown that investors may benefit by imposing caps or maximums on sector weights. Our study suggests that the best results can be achieved when sectors are rebalanced on a monthly basis whenever a particular sector exceeds 10% of the value of the overall market. We feel that these results suggest that sector limitations may help investors mitigate the recurrent but unpredictable sector collapses that characterize the investment climate¹⁰.

¹⁰ Results of this study are provided for informational purposes and do not constitute a solicitation or offer to subscribe for or purchase any securities or investment services. Results of this study are not intended to provide a sufficient basis on which to make an investment decision. Past performance should not be taken as an indication or guarantee of future performance, and no representation or warranty, expressed or implied is made regarding future performance. The portfolios used in the study at various sector caps as well as the various assumptions are hypothetical and for illustration purposes only and in no way are to be construed as reflective of actual account performance or investment practices of South Texas Money Management, Ltd. (STMM). The information in this article has been obtained from or based upon sources believed by the author to be reliable, but neither of the authors nor STMM represents or warrants its accuracy or completeness and is not responsible for losses or damages arising out of errors, omissions or changes in market factors.